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Abstract
Delegation, from a technical point of view, is widely considered as a potential ap-
proach in addressing the problem of providing dynamic access control decisions
in activities with a high level of collaboration, either within a single security
domain or across multiple security domains. Although delegation continues to
attract significant attention from the research community, presently, there is no
published work that presents a taxonomy of delegation concepts and models.
This article intends to address this gap by presenting a set of taxonomic criteria
relevant to the concept of delegation. This article also applies the taxonomy to
a selection of significant delegation models published in the literature.
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1. Introduction
Today’s information processing systems are increasingly characterised by
their distributed and dynamic nature. Continuously evolving coalitions of indi-
vidual systems are created to address business needs that emphasize partnering,
outsourcing and service composition. Such systems require a high level of flexi-
bility and it is not always possible to anticipate in advance the set of privileges
a user may need to complete a task. In this context, delegation appears to be a
potential solution as it provides a means to express and enforce access control
policies in a dynamic and flexible manner, particularly across security domain
boundaries.
Delegation in information technology settings is an ill-defined concept with-
out a clear boundary. Currently, there is no single study that provides a compre-
hensive taxonomy of delegation concepts and models. This makes it difficult to
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compare and contrast the existing proposals in the literature and to articulate
the ways in which they are similar and how they differ. Also, the terminology
used in the delegation literature is not used consistently, which further compli-
cates any comparative analysis. Thus, there is a need for a taxonomy which
acts as a conceptual framework to help researchers position their research. This
article proposes a set of taxonomic criteria which can be used to analyse dele-
gation proposals and models. This article also applies the criteria to a selection
of significant delegation proposals to characterise each approach.
The rest of the article is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses differ-
ent facets of the complex concept of delegation, drawing a distinction between
delegation in a social and business context (traditional usage) and ways to recog-
nise and support delegation in an information processing system (technological
usage). Section 3 presents a taxonomy for delegation support in information
systems. Section 4 discusses notable themes in development of the delegation
concept and identifies likely future trends. Section 5 reviews notable delegation
proposals and analyses them using the characteristics described in the taxon-
omy. Section 6 concludes the article.
In this article, for clarity we use terminology adapted from the XACML
specification [5]. A subject or user is an entity that can perform an action by
invoking a process. Actions affect data, services and system components, which
are called objects or resources. The privilege or right to perform an action on
a resource is governed by rules expressed over attributes of subjects, resources
and possibly the environment. Attributes are characteristics that describe or
can be associated with an entity. Examples of attributes include name, age,
role membership and location. Entities include both subjects and objects. A
subject who performs a delegation is referred to as a delegator and the recipient
of the delegation is a delegatee. An attribute is said to be delegatable if it can
be granted by one subject to another. Delegation should only occur when the
delegatee possesses the requisite authority to delegate. Authority is legitimately
obtained power to act or instruct others to act. Authority itself can be delegated.
Only a subset of subject attributes is delegatable: attributes that represent facts
about subjects such as name and age cannot be arbitrarily delegated but may
be assigned where they accurately represent a characteristic of the delegatee.
Thus a subject with appropriate authority may be permitted to delegate their
role to another but not their date of birth.
2. Delegation from Social and Technical Perspectives
The requirement for delegation support in access control exists due to the
need to reflect and enforce organisational control principles in information sys-
tems. Delegation arises as a business or social concept, where a person pos-
sessing authority appoints or authorises another to transact on their behalf. If
the transaction affects information assets, the delegation subsequently needs to
be recognised, facilitated and controlled within an information system. This
section discusses delegation from these two distinct but related perspectives: as
a social construct and as a process to be supported by a technical system.
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Much of the confusion about the meaning of the term delegation may be due
to the fact that researchers approach delegation-related concepts from different
directions with different objectives. For example, some proposals focus on formal
modelling [18, 33, 27], some focus on protocols and the exchange of credentials
[21, 35] and some focus on data flow (as in the business process management
discipline) [13, 9]. However, a substantial number of research papers tend to
focus on implementation issues with only a few papers articulating precisely
what they mean by delegation [19].
Generally accepted principles of organisational control that predate comput-
erised information systems, are based on the delegation of specific and bounded
authority from the owners or custodians of an organisation to named positions
of responsibility or roles (e.g. divisional manager or finance director) [23]. An
organisational chart can thus be seen as a trace of the hierarchical flow of del-
egated authority. While a position is held at a point in time by an individual,
the authority typically attaches to the position, not the person. When someone
changes job their authority and the rights and privileges associated with it are
transferred to their successor. As large organisations became more reliant on in-
formation systems through the 1980s and 1990s, this principle of the delegation
of authority motivated the development of role-based models of access control
which allocate a collection of rights (a role, which is effectively a coherent set of
capabilities required for a job function) to an individual indirectly via granting
them membership of the role, for example, the approach of Baldwin [11].
Responsibility for the protection of an organisation’s information assets is
typically delegated by the owners of the organisation to senior management
positions. Senior management may, in turn, delegate authority to a security
administrator, who is empowered to allocate rights and privileges to subjects
having a legitimate need, by virtue of their position within the organisation.
The centralised allocation of rights and privileges by a security administrator
is a process known as authorisation or administrative delegation [18], and it
allows the information system to recognise the delegated authority of particular
positions or roles to utilise information assets and computing resources to pursue
organisational goals. While authorisation recognises the delegated authority and
responsibility of subjects to perform goal-oriented tasks, in a technical setting,
the term delegation is more commonly applied to user or ad-hoc delegation.
Ad-hoc delegation describes a scenario where a subject A (who is not a
security administrator) delegates some of their own rights to subject B for a
limited time. To ensure that B can be held accountable for actions performed
with the delegated rights, the system must be able to distinguish an action
performed by A, from an action performed by B on behalf of A. An action
performed by B on their own authority should also be distinguishable from an
action by B on behalf of A. If the system does not explicitly support accountable
ad-hoc delegation it will not recognise B’s act as one performed by B under A’s
authority for A’s benefit.
Assuming the delegator is legitimately empowered to exercise a degree of
flexibility in how they discharge their responsibility, ad-hoc delegation may be
necessary when the current state of the authorisation system does not allow the
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delegatee to perform the actions desired by the delegator [29]. For example,
a payroll department manager may be permitted to delegate to an assistant
manager, the right to approve the fortnightly transfer of salary payments when
the manager is on leave.
Accountability is a critical issue when implementing technical support for
ad-hoc delegation. If ad-hoc delegation is not explicitly supported by the autho-
risation system, the flexibility required to deal with circumstances such as that
noted in the previous paragraph may be achieved through insecure means. For
example, the payroll manager may instruct the security administrator to assign
the assistant manager the role of payroll manager in their absence. However,
this role may typically possess a more powerful and extensive set of rights than
is required by the assistant manager to simply process and approve the salary
payments in the manager’s absence. For example, the assistant may be able
to increase their own annual salary or that of a friend. The granularity of
delegated rights is a critical issue in ad-hoc delegation. It is also important
in authorisation and delegation frameworks for workflow systems, since access
rights need to be expressed for individual tasks within a workflow [9]. It is
important to point out that there are many situations where the uncertainty,
caused by sharing capabilities via delegation, is not an advantage because it
conflicts with accountability and auditing requirements [19, 26].
A distinction can be drawn between delegation of rights via transfer (where
the delegator relinquishes the ability to use the delegated rights) and delegation
via a grant (where the delegator retains the ability to exercise the delegated
rights) [18]. However, it is worth noting that the terms grant and transfer
are not used consistently in the delegation literature with this meaning. Some
authors argue that transfer delegation is desirable because sensitive access rights
should not be available to a large number of users at any given time. It can
also be useful when an access control policy specifies cardinality limits on the
availability of access privileges between users [18, 28].
Crispo [19] proposes the notion of delegation of responsibility which is essen-
tially transfer delegation. His motivation is to ensure that the delegatee can be
held accountable for actions taken with the delegated rights on the basis that
the delegator could not exercise them while they were available to the delegatee.
As has been previously noted, accountability is supported when the information
system can distinguish an action of B on behalf of A from an action of either B
or of A. Transfer delegation is one way, but not the only way of achieving this.
From a legal perspective, it is not generally possible to delegate responsibil-
ity. Indeed, Crispo [19], in discussing his concept of delegation of responsibility,
notes that “we cannot technically establish who is going to be legally, morally
or socially liable for an action”. Legally, it is important to note that irrespective
of who receives delegation, the delegator will generally remain responsible for
the activities that have been delegated. Thus, while it may be possible within
a technical system to delegate tasks or duties to another, this does not mean
that the associated responsibility has also been transferred.
This section has considered a number of interpretations of the concept of
delegation in social and technical settings. The following section examines these
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interpretations in greater detail by proposing a taxonomy of characteristics of
delegation models.
3. A Taxonomy
The traditional delegation concept, as it is applied in social, legal and busi-
ness settings, is understood as a process that allows one entity (the delegatee) to
act on behalf of another entity (the delegator). The term acting on behalf im-
plies that, after the delegation, the responsibility for, and benefits of the action
remain with the delegator.
This article is principally concerned with the implementation of the delega-
tion concept in information system settings where it has a more specific meaning
and scope. Delegation is considered as a proxy process in which one entity makes
available the necessary rights to another entity to enable the receiver to perform
certain duties on their behalf while addressing specified obligations and meeting
particular constraints (e.g. with respect to duration, frequency, separation of
duty etc.). Note that this definition includes both administrative and ad-hoc
delegation within its scope. A delegation process usually includes a mechanism
to revoke the delegated rights.
Before presenting the taxonomy, a simple example of a delegation transaction
between two different security domains follows. The goal of the example is
to illuminate a range of issues that are significant when considering possible
approaches to the delegation problem. As can be seen in Figure 1, after receiving
delegation from the delegator, the delegatee uses the delegated rights to gain
access to a database on another system via a web-based application.
Figure 1: A typical delegation transaction across 2 security domains.
The access request executes as follows: the delegatee uses the delegation to
apply for access (1). The request is forwarded to the Web Server (2) which
forwards it to the Application Server (3). The request goes through an authen-
tication and authorisation process in which it is validated by the LDAP (4)
5
and Access Control Server (5). The access control decision is returned to the
Application Server (6) for enforcement. The final step is to forward the request
for the resource to the SQL Server (7).
The first question concerns how the delegation should be recorded and com-
municated in the respective Domain 1 and 2 systems. While there are many
options, a few examples follow: the delegation could be represented as a token
given to the Domain 1 requester specifying the subjects, and Domain 2 rights
and objects that are the subject of the delegation. It could be implemented as
a new rule included in the Domain 2 Access Control Server policy base, that
specifies that the Domain 1 delegatee should be given the specified access. It
could be expressed via new attributes recorded in the Domain 2 LDAP Di-
rectory that recognise the Domain 1 requester and their delegated rights or it
could be some combination of these. This will be determined by the authorisa-
tion model adopted in each domain (role based, attribute based etc.) and the
specific delegation approach.
The second issue relates to delegation constraints. While the Domain 2 del-
egator may have some flexibility in what they can delegate and who they can
delegate to, this must occur within specified limits to observe basic principles of
organisational control and asset protection. Constraints are particularly impor-
tant in cross-domain ad-hoc delegation since resource access is being granted by
normal users to subjects external to the organisation. For example, the Domain
2 policy may state that certain access rights can be granted by a Domain 2
Marketing Manager to a Domain 1 Marketing Manager. This raises the ques-
tion of how (or if) the Domain 2 systems (Application Server, Access Control
Server and SQL Server) establish that the requester is a Domain 1 Marketing
Manager?
Considering the need for accountability of both the delegator and delegatee,
a further issue relates to the identity of the requester that request executes
under in the Application Server, Access Control Server and SQL Server. To
ensure full accountability and accurate audit logging, each of these three Domain
2 components should be aware that the request originates from Subject A, a
Domain 1 Marketing Manager on behalf of Subject B, a Domain 2 Marketing
Manager. However, this will only be possible if each of these components is
delegation-aware. Depending on where the delegation is honoured, it may be
that the Access Control Server is delegation-aware but the Application Server
and SQL Server are not. This has implications for the enforcement of more
complex constraints such as dynamic separation and binding of duty, which
require tight application integration and awareness to effectively enforce [18].
The granularity of privileges is also a difficult control issue. For example, if
the delegatee receives via delegation the role “Domain 2 Marketing Manager”,
the delegatee will have the full set of privileges that is associated with this
role. In many cases, the full set of privileges is more than is necessary for the
access request. Also, since the Application Server and SQL Server can both act
as access decision and enforcement points for the request, there is an issue of
consistency of granularity of delegated rights. For example, the SQL server may
recognise the delegation as granting a larger set of rights than the Application
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Server, potentially creating a vulnerability if there is an enforcement flaw in the
application logic.
Though not presented in the scenario, there are other issues such as if there
is a broker that makes the relationship of the original delegator and the final
delegate indirect. Also, if the transaction requires the combined information
resources of Domains 1 and 2 rather than a simple one way access request,
constraint enforcement becomes still more complicated as the Domain 1 system
must now be able to selectively control the delegations that its subjects accept
since they have implications for usage of Domain 1 information assets.
The rest of the section will discuss each characteristic of the technological
aspects of delegation in detail.
3.1. Motivation
Depending on the type of the operational environment, there may be differ-
ent factors motivating delegation between subjects. These include:
1. Lack of authorisation: A subject does not have sufficient access rights
to perform the required actions on information resources to complete a
task. This is the most common motivation for delegation, which can
occur between collaborating entities where one subject requires delegated
authority to access services which its home organisation does not provide
but other collaborating organisations do.
2. Lack of or conflicted policies: Achievement of a legitimate goal impli-
cates policies which conflict, preventing the required actions. The subject
involved with the activities may need to delegate the tasks to another
subject which is not affected by the conflicted policies. This situation can
occur when there are exceptional operational circumstances that were not
anticipated by the security policy designer. An example is when key staff
are temporarily not available causing dynamic separation or binding of
duty policies to be violated.
3.2. Delegation Boundary
The delegation can happen within a single security domain or across mul-
tiple security domains. Delegation within a single security domain is relatively
simple to manage because of the centralised administration and storage of poli-
cies and credentials. Most earlier proposals restricted their scope to delegation
within a single security domain [30]. As the issues of security for collaborative
environments have emerged, the concept of delegation needs to be considered
from a new angle: delegation across multiple security domains, as illustrated in
Figure 1.
Cross domain delegation can bring flexibility to collaborative activities and
can meet the needs of new business models in dynamic environments [25]. How-
ever, cross domain delegation must cope with the complexity in building dele-
gation protocols and exchanging/validating delegation tokens due to the poten-
tial inconsistency of authorisation models and security approaches adopted by
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different systems. Cross domain delegation must also take into account the dis-
tribution of applicable policies across various security domains. Credential and
delegation information are also distributed in cross domain delegation. Trust
issues must also be addressed in cross domain delegation, especially for ad-hoc
delegation.
3.3. Who requests delegation?
As the motivations discussed in Section 3.1 are relevant for both normal
users and the system authority, delegation can be requested by the user or the
system authority.
Delegation requested by users is common. Consider for example, when a
CEO employs a company secretary, he will want to allocate certain duties to
the company secretary, for example, preparing the annual financial report. In a
sense, this is the allocation of responsibility (a granting process) from the CEO
to the company secretary. In contrast, delegation from the system authority is
considered as a special case. Administrative delegation by the system author-
ity supports established and predictable operational processes which are well
pre-defined by the organisation’s policies and procedures. In this type of dele-
gation, the system authority actually does not request the delegation for itself;
it requests it on behalf of the delegator and delegatee.
3.4. Who delegates?
The delegator can be a user (ad-hoc), or a system authority (administrative).
Schaad argued that ad-hoc delegation and administrative delegation can be
differentiated based on three factors: the representation of the authority to
delegate, the specific relation of the delegator to the delegated rights, and the
duration of the delegation (how long the delegated rights are effective) [29].
Administrative delegation is the basic form of delegation in which an ad-
ministrator or system authority assigns rights to enable users to perform their
assigned tasks. This process typically happens when a user joins a security
domain or changes job position. The delegator, in this case, represents the au-
thority of the system. This process is also known as privilege assignment. In
this type of delegation, the delegator does not need to possess the ability to use
the delegated attributes and often, self-delegation of attributes to the adminis-
trator is not permitted. The duration of delegation is typically longer lasting
than is the case in user delegation.
In user delegation, the delegator is a normal user. So the delegator represents
the authority of the user only. This is the case in which a user grants or transfers
the whole or a subset of their access rights to other users. As the user is the
delegator, the user must possess the ability to utilise the rights to be able to
perform delegation. This type of delegation is typically short-lived and intended
for a specific purpose [18, 29]. Much of the investigation in this area has been
motivated by the development of authorisation models for workflow systems.
While administrative delegation has been employed and studied thoroughly,
user delegation still faces many obstacles.
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3.5. Relationship of the parties in the delegation process
From the nature of the connection between the delegator and the delegatee,
the delegation process can be considered as either direct delegation or indirect
delegation (sub-delegation).
Direct delegation occurs when the delegator directly sends the delegation
assertion to the delegatee. In contrast, indirect delegation is performed with
the involvement of one or many intermediate parties which can forward the
delegation assertion from the delegator to the delegatee. Indirect delegation is
mainly performed to achieve a multi-step delegation. In the indirect delegation
process, the delegation conducted between the intermediate entities can be con-
sidered as a direct delegation process. So it can be said that indirect delegation
is constructed by chaining a series of direct delegation transactions.
From the management perspective, direct delegation is a relatively sim-
ple process. However, with indirect delegation, revocation and accountabil-
ity/auditing present non-trivial problems. Indirect delegation is especially im-
portant in the context of cross domain delegation when the delegation traverses
various security domains.
3.6. Authority Pre-Approval
Delegation can be pre-approved or optimistic. In the case of ad-hoc dele-
gation, it is common for the delegation process to involve pre-approval by the
authority via the process of assessing the involved policies of the systems of the
delegator and the delegatee (if the two systems are different). However, there
is also the case where the pre-approval of the authority is not practical. At the
time a delegator receives a delegation request, it does not necessarily know in
advance whether a particular set of delegated rights can be used by the dele-
gatee, since it may not have a complete understanding of the current security
context of the delegatee, the current set of attributes of the delegatee, and the
policies of the delegatee’s systems, etc. To avoid making a delegation that will
not be honoured, the delegator could contact the relevant authorisation author-
ities to ask “if I delegate these rights to user X from domain Y, will they be
honoured?” But asking this question in advance for each delegation transaction
is inefficient as the authorisation authority will then need to evaluate the re-
quest twice - once for the pre-approval and once for the actual execution by the
delegatee. Therefore, in optimistic delegation, the delegator agrees to conduct
the delegation transaction on the basis of its best knowledge of the constraints
and conditions for the delegation transaction, for example, the policies of its
systems, the attributes, etc. It does not guarantee that the delegatee will be
able to successfully use the rights for service invocation. This is the best ef-
fort delegation of the delegator or in other words, an optimistic delegation. In
an optimistic delegation transaction wherein the delegator simply assumes that
the delegation will succeed, it does require the authorisation authority in ad-
vance to confirm that the delegation will be effective. If the delegation fails,
the delegation commitment framework provides a way of recording, identifying,
reporting and correcting the problem. Therefore, optimistic delegation may be
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more efficient as it does not require pre-approval of the authorisation author-
ity. This feature is important for dynamic delegation across multiple security
domains. This feature is not commonly discussed by many models. Recently,
some approaches such as Gomi et al. [21], Chadwick et al. [16] and XACML
v3.0 [6] have recognised the importance of this characteristic and take it into
account.
3.7. What to delegate?
What to delegate is the core and the most controversial topic in the field.
The object of the delegation process is a key aspect on which proposed models
differ. The following three main cases are evident in published proposals:
1. Case 1 : The delegatee takes on attributes of another entity (the delegator)
which has the capability to perform the task. The delegatee is given the
delegator’s attributes via an unforgeable token which effectively allows the
delegatee to complete the task.
2. Case 2 : The delegatee is assigned some attributes that the authority will
evaluate in the context of a set of applicable policies. New policies or
rules can also be written to adjudicate access requests that involve the
new attributes. The difference to Case 1 is that the delegated attributes
are considered as new attributes of the delegatee while in Case 1, the
delegated attributes are treated as if they are from the delegator.
3. Case 3 : The delegatee is assigned new responsibilities as part of the dele-
gation commitment between the involved parties or part of the constraints
set by the applicable policies. The new responsibilities may or may not
come with some attributes which effectively reflect and enable new respon-
sibilities. Very often, the attribute that represents new responsibility is
“role”. This case, however, more precisely reflects the social nature of the
delegation concept.
To stimulate the above cases, at the abstract level, there are two trends:
1. Delegation of Capability : Case 1 and Case 2 represent a type of delegation
of capability as the delegation will enable new capability in the delegatee.
It is important to note that the term capability in this article is used in a
different sense compared to capability as in capability-based systems such
as IBM System i or the CMU Hydra operating system. In fact, it is similar
to capability as defined in POSIX Draft 1003.1e/2c [2] as a capability does
not need to be associated with a specified object. A capability is simply
a representation of the ability to perform a specified task.
2. Delegation of Responsibility (Case 3): It is a form of transferring tasks as
well as obligations/conditions or commitments which are associated and
covered by certain responsibilities from one entity to another [9].
In general, delegation of capability is technically well defined. This type of
delegation is defined to cope with the demand for a high level of granularity and
is appropriate for environments which require a high level of flexibility. How-
ever, delegation of responsibility is considered as a broader concept compared
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to delegation of capability. From the responsibility perspective, the process is
defined via the responsibility to transfer or grant. It is assumed that necessary
attributes or rules to complete the duties will be transferred or granted upon
completing the process. The associated obligations/conditions or commitments
are considered as part of the delegation process. Delegation of responsibility
offers the possibility to simulate social aspects of delegation and so is especially
suitable for more complex organisational control goals in workflow systems [?
]. It is important to note that, granting/allocating responsibility is common.
However, it is not possible to transfer responsibility via delegation process due
to the requirement to maintain accountability and audit trail to the delegator.
3.8. How much to delegate?
In general, depending on the needs of the delegator and delegatee, the del-
egation can be partial or total delegation. Partial delegation can be achieved
by delegating just a specific subset of capabilities/responsibilities. On the other
hand, total delegation can be achieved by delegating the whole set of capabil-
ities/responsibilities associated with certain attributes. Total delegation is the
extreme case.
In fact, the concepts of partial and total delegation are quite relative. For
example, a role delegation transaction can be considered either partial or to-
tal delegation. If the delegator has multiple roles, then delegation of one of
these roles is partial. However, the same delegation is also recognised as total
if considering the whole set of capabilities/responsibilities associated with the
delegated role. To clarify this issue, Crampton and Khambhammettu argued
that by delegating a privilege, the delegator gives the delegatee the capability to
this privilege [18]. However, delegating a role gives the delegatee the ability to
act in this role. Therefore, the delegatee is authorized for this role and thereby
gains the capability to use all privileges assigned to this role and associated
junior-roles [18].
In addition, the term partial and total are relative because in scenarios sim-
ilar to Figure 1, it is often the case that the application server acts as the access
decision enforcement point, controlling access to the resource (the data managed
by the SQL server). Therefore, there is the possibility that when the delegatee
requests a service using delegated rights, the request may be successfully recog-
nised by the application server as a result of delegation but the SQL server has
no capability to do this because it is not delegation-aware. Therefore, a del-
egation may be considered as partial by the application server (higher layers)
but from the SQL server’s perspective (lower layers), it is a total delegation.
This can cause problems with accountability when it is necessary to trace the
delegator and the delegatees’ activities.
3.9. How long to delegate?
Delegation can be time-constrained to effectively end or revoke the delegation
after a period of time. Therefore, a delegation transaction can be either temporal
or permanent.
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Temporal delegation is a time-restricted delegation of which the validity
period is set by either the delegator or the system authority. On the other hand,
permanent delegation is a type of delegation which does not need a specified
expiry time. The delegation and revocation process is triggered by a specified
event. This type of delegation can be considered as relatively permanent.
Permanent delegation is usually associated with administrative delegation
due to the nature of the relationship of the delegator and the delegatee and the
organisation’s policies. In ad-hoc delegation, permanent delegation is rare and
is usually considered as a failure of the system to cope with a certain set of tasks.
If such delegation activities occur frequently; have a frequent pattern or users
delegate indefinitely, then this indicates that the current organisational struc-
ture and procedures do not reflect the goals of the involved entities. Therefore,
temporary and ad hoc delegation should now become part of the regular admin-
istrative delegation activities shaping the formal organisational structure. It is
worthy to note that, initially, temporal delegation was not widely supported but
over time, temporal delegation has become a mandatory requirement for every
delegation approach. Almost every current delegation approach is designed to
support temporal delegation.
3.10. How to delegate?
From the operational perspective, delegation may be classified into two cat-
egories: grant delegation or transfer delegation [18].
In grant delegation, a successful delegation operation allows a delegated
attribute to be available to both the delegator and delegatee. So after a grant
delegation, both delegatee and delegator will share some common attributes.
Grant delegation enables the availability of attributes to increase monotonically
with delegations [18]. Grant delegation is primarily concerned with allowing the
delegatee to use the delegated attributes.
On the other hand, in transfer delegation models, besides allowing the del-
egatee to use the delegated attributes, the mechanism must be able to prevent
the use of the delegated attributes by the delegator. This means that following
a successful delegation operation, the ability to use delegated attributes is trans-
ferred to the delegatee and the delegated attributes are no longer available to
the delegator. This requirement makes transfer delegation policy enforcement
more difficult [18, 29]. While many scenarios require support grant delegations,
transfer delegation rarely happens in the real world.
3.11. Approach to Conduct Delegation
From the implementation perspective, delegation can be enabled via two
approaches:
• By exchanging tokens.
• By issuing policies.
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In most early approaches, exchanging tokens to facilitate delegation was com-
mon [30, 21]. This approach is popular because it can better visualise the way
in which delegation actually happens in the real world. This approach brings
with it a number of shortcomings: namely, overhead for exchanging tokens and
extension effort of storing and administering tokens. Token management is
also an issue. Revocation becomes very difficult if the delegation come across
many intermediate entities. However, this approach is still necessary in many
cases. The most obvious advantage is that exchanging tokens can be easily im-
plemented in legacy systems without major modification of the existing access
control mechanisms.
The second approach can reduce the overhead of exchanging token by elim-
inating the need of delegation token via issuing appropriate policies to honour
the delegation [6]. This approach, however, requires an implementation of an
authorisation mechanism and a policy management architecture in which the
delegator is allowed to define their own policies over the resources they own.
Early access control models in which all administrative power flows from the
central authority, are not appropriate to implement this approach. Issuing poli-
cies also does not resolve the issue of delegation token management, because
in general, the effort to manage the delegation policy and delegation token are
essentially equal.
The approach to implement delegation really affects the final design of the
access control architecture. With the old approach (exchanging tokens), the
access control architecture does not need to change. Only the authority that
receives the delegation token needs to adapt to understand the nature of del-
egation tokens to make appropriate decisions. However, if using the approach
of creating policies, the access control architecture needs to change to take into
account the policies created by users as the result of the delegation process. For
example, in Figure 1, if the approach of creating policies is utilised, the access
control server has to be programmed to capture and recognise the authority
of the user-created policies for decision making, in addition to the traditional
policies created by the system authority.
3.12. Type of Credential
To facilitate delegation via exchanging tokens, early pioneers in the field ex-
plored the ability to use a generic token to perform the delegation transaction
[16, 24, 26]. In a very simple form, the generic delegation token (dT) from
the delegator (DO) to the delegatee (DE) can contain public keys pbKDO and
pbKDE of the delegator and the delegatee respectively, the involved attributes
(dAttb), associated obligations (dO), a timestamp (t) and a transaction identi-
fier (trID):
dT = {pbKDO, pbKDE , {dAttb}, {dO}, t, trID}SignedByDelegator (1)
In general, there are three forms of credentials which are commonly used to
bear delegation information: X.509 based token [17], SAML based token [4], and
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generic token. Over time, the delegation credential has become more sophisti-
cated. Currently, most proposals use the SAML assertion and more popularly
X.509-based attribute certificate (such as in the PRIMA [22] and PERMIS [15]
system) as the means to bear the delegation credential. OASIS SAML provides
a rich syntax and associated protocols for addressing different types of asser-
tions. However, the normative standards of SAML do not officially support
delegation [15, 16]. Therefore, there are some proposals to utilise a modified
version of SAML assertion to meet the demands of delegation [35]. SAML is
also supported by the WS-* family [7], especially WS-Federation and WS-Trust.
However, despite the flexibility and compatibility of SAML, this approach has
not attracted much attention from the research community compared to the
rival X.509. It is primarily because SAML is an emerging standard while X.509
with PKI is a well defined standard and is currently widely supported by many
commercial systems. A hybrid approach is also considered by wrapping a X.509
certificate by a SAML assertion. This combines the strength of the well defined
structure of X.509 certificate with the flexibility and expressiveness of SAML.
It is worthy to note that the generic form of delegation token above can be
only useful in a single delegation transaction. For a multi-step delegation with
the involvement of multiple intermediate entities, it is essential to employ a more
complex form of delegation token via a different combination of multiple delega-
tion tokens. In general, there are three possible combinations: Chained Token
(simple serialisation of multiple tokens), Nested Token (nesting each single token
within the signed part of the next immediate token) and Linked Token (instead
of nesting the whole previous delegation token in the delegation chain, only
the unique transaction identifier of the previous token will be nested) [14, 30].
While, chained token is the simplest form in which, the multi-step (n step) dele-
gation tokens are organized in a simple sequence, nested token and linked token
are represented in a more complex form to improve security and efficiency of
the delegation process.
3.13. Key Scheme
Cryptographic protection plays an important role in securing the exchanged
delegated rights between the delegator and the delegatee. Cryptography is
used to encrypt and sign the delegation tokens. Currently, due to the increas-
ingly popular and well standardised PKI with X.509 certificate [20], asymmetric
cryptography seems to be the default option for constructing delegation proto-
cols. However, Varadharajan suggests that both symmetric and asymmetric
key schemes can be used either separately or in combination to support the
delegation process [30, 31]. He emphasises that it is important to understand
that the delegation can also deploy with a symmetric system as long as the
secret key is associated with the delegator and the delegatee. The symmetric
key approach is somewhat similar to the asymmetric key approach, in that the
underlying principle of signing or encrypting the delegation token is the same.
However, in this case, the secret key used to encrypt or sign the delegation token
is assumed to be shared between the delegator and the delegatee and issued by
a trusted third party which can be the system authority. Given the trust in
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the third party, this gives the effect of a signature mechanism. As it is assumed
that no other entity has access to this secret key, the delegation token cannot
be forged, manipulated or read by other entities. The main disadvantage of
using a symmetric key scheme is that the delegator and delegatee have to es-
tablish a key-exchange session and this complicates the delegation process. It
also increases traffic and overhead of the whole system.
3.14. Where delegation happens?
The delegation can happen at two levels: system level and user/application
level.
At the system level, the delegation is classic in the sense that the delegation
is pre-defined in a concise manner. This type of delegation is often limited to
a set of well studied scenarios. In the system level, delegation usually happens
as part of the supported access control model, for example, adding a user to
a group in UNIX. Delegation at this level is considered as part of the access
control infrastructure but there is a lack of flexibility to cope with unconven-
tional scenarios, especially in collaborating activities with external parties. This
is where delegation at the user level can make a difference. Delegation at the
user or application level is usually ad-hoc in nature and is necessary to deliver
the required degree of flexibility. At the user or application level, people may
need to accommodate not only different technical standards but also different
workflows, business processes and frameworks. In this context, delegation is an
essential element in business processes which require a high level of collabora-
tion. In general, workflows control the execution of business processes in an
organisation at the technical or information system level [9, 13].
Commonly, a workflow consists of a set of tasks which are designed to be
completed by collaboration of multiple entities. Security policies are required
to regulate and manage the way the workflow should be performed. Security
policies can specify a wide range of constraints, from a simple rule such as
which user is allowed to execute a task to more complex ones such as dynamic
separation of duties, etc. [9]. A user may choose to delegate the whole or part of
their assigned tasks to others. The delegation is usually short-lived (temporary)
and occurs when certain conditions are satisfied. Implementing and enforcing
policies such as these is a difficult task in complex systems where different
organisations usually need to collaborate to complete different parts of a larger
complex workflow. The main issue is the potential constraints arising from the
organisational policies that regulate a business process (for example, a staff
member can delegate his/her duties when on annual leave). These constraints
need to be enforced by the technical system.
User-driven (ad-hoc) delegation with the concept of commitment, constraints,
etc. can be the key for providing an integrated solution for consistent access
policy enforcement across cooperating systems in highly collaborating activities.
This makes delegation, especially user to user delegation (ad hoc delegation),
particularly useful in environments with different workflows and business pro-
cesses.
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3.15. Where is delegation honoured?
Any access control system is centred around the following two functions:
access decision making and access decision enforcing. This concept was first
discussed in detail in the work of M. D. Abrams et al. in 1990 [8] and later
standardised in the ISO 10181-3 (1996) - Access Control Framework [1]. The
IETF Policy Framework Working Group and the Distributed Management Task
Force (DMTF)/Common Information Model (CIM) defined these functions as
Access Control Decision Function (ADF) and Access Control Enforcement Func-
tion (AEF). The ADF evaluates the involved policies and context information
and produces an authorisation decision. The AEF, on the other hand, per-
forms access control by enforcing the decision produced by the ADF (Figure 2).
Commonly, the authorities exercising these functions are also known as Policy
Decision Point (PDP) and Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) respectively. When
a request is associated with a delegation, the validation process can be conducted
PDP with the partial contribution of the PEP or an additional authority which
governs delegation transactions.
Figure 2: A generic access control system [1].
In theory, the PEP may be considered as part of the delegation validation
process. This is because the PEP is the authority that receives the request from
the user (the requestor). From this point of view, the PEP in cooperation with
the context handler, are responsible for receiving the credentials from users and
passing them to the PDP for decision making. On the other hand, the PDP is
responsible for evaluating the policy (also taking into account the credentials
provided by users). This is the central point for checking and validating. So
it is very natural for delegation to be validated by the PDP. Most delegation-
supporting access control models consider the validation process as an additional
function of the PDP. In XACML, delegation can be considered as a part of the
context information which the Policy Information Point (PIP) and the context
handler must feed to the PDP for decision making. Otherwise, the PEP must
collect the delegated credential and other delegation information and then pass
them to the PDP via the context handler. In many applications, policies specify
actions or obligations that must be performed as part of the access. (In case
of XACML, agreement between a Policy Administration Point and the PEP is
required). From this perspective, the PEP must be involved in the delegation
validation process. This is the main difference between this approach and the
approach of using an additional component for credential collection.
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The second approach is to use an additional authority such as the Credential
Service [16] or the Delegation Authority [21] to govern the delegation function.
Figure 3 shows the way in which the additional authority, Credential Service,
could be incorporated into the XACML model. In fact, the PDP is still re-
sponsible for decision making. However, in this approach, the PEP is not the
authority to collect and transfer the delegation credential to the PDP for deci-
sion making. This function is performed by the new delegation authority. In
the context of XACML, the delegation authority could also act as a replacement
for the PIP. The advantage of this approach is that systems with existing access
control models do not need to change. The only change is to provide an interface
to call and respond to the delegation authority. In the design of Chadwick et
al., the Credential Service could be either an additional component to be called
by the PEP or the PIP [16]. This approach transfers part of the delegation
credential validation to the delegation authority. However, authorisation is still
under the authority of the PDP. Therefore, no approach can completely replace
the PDP in the decision making process. The use of an additional delegation
authority can allow applications to support multiple autonomous security do-
mains without changing the application logic [16]. In such cases, only a new
credential validation policy is needed. A delegation credential can be validated
by adding appropriate policy to the PAP when necessary. This feature is im-
portant if the ad-hoc nature of collaborative activities across multiple security
domains is taken into account. The main difference between the two approaches
is the authority (the PIP or the additional delegation authority) who handles
user’s credentials including the delegation tokens.
Table 1 summarises the main taxonomic criteria that distinguish current
delegation approaches.
4. Analysis and Discussion
The first five taxonomy criteria are fundamental and considered as the basis
of the delegation process. It is essential for a delegation approach to consider
these five criteria. The motivation is different from one approach to another.
The difference lies not only in the purpose that motivates the approach but also,
the view of the designer regarding the primary weakness of the access control
model with respect to delegation.
To date, most delegation models have been centralised and based on the
RBAC model. In these models, to support partial and role-role delegation, the
role hierarchy may need to be modified to a complex structure. Delegation of
capabilities seems to be a major concern of most models, except for some recent
delegation models for workflow such as the works of Atluri and Warner [9], Gomi
et al. [21] and Chadwick et al. [15, 16]. Most models have problems with partial
and user (ad-hoc) delegation. Therefore, the degree and effectiveness of support
for partial and ad-hoc delegation acts as a criterion to differentiate the models
and their advancement.
It is also worth noting that, until the early 2000s, most published works re-
garding delegation can primarily address the delegation between entities within
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Characteristic Factor
Motivation - Insufficient authorisation
- Insufficient or conflicted policies
Delegation Boundary - Within a security domain
- Across multiple security domains
Who requests delegation? - User
- System Authority
Who delegates? - User (Ad-hoc)
- System Authority (Administrative)
Relationship of the parties - Direct
- Indirect
Authority Pre-Approval - Yes
- No (Optimistic Delegation)
What to delegate? - Capability
- Responsibility
How much to delegate? - Partial
- Total
How long to delegate? - Temporal
- Permanent
How to delegate? - Transfer
- Grant
Approach to conduct delegation - By issuing policies
- By exchanging tokens
Type of Credential - X.509 based token
- SAML based token
- Generic token
Key Scheme - Symmetric Key
- Asymmetric Key
Where delegation happens? - User level (Application)
- System level
Where is delegation honoured? - Access Decision Point
- An additional authority for delegation
Table 1: Characteristics of Delegation.
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Figure 3: The Credential Validation Service (CVS) and XACML model [10].
a single security domain. More recently, cross-domain aspects have attracted
more attention from the research community. It can be seen that most recently
developed models are purposefully designed to support cross domain delega-
tion [9, 21, 15, 16]. As discussed above, cross domain delegation is designed to
achieve flexibility to meet the demand of collaborative activities. However, it is
much more complicated to implement and enforce constraints over ad-hoc del-
egation in cross domain models (Chadwick et al. [16] vs. Varadharajan, Allen
and Black [30]). In addition to the same issues of classic delegation (within a
single domain), managing the complexity of protocol and policy is a paramount
issue. Such complexity requires a very well designed protocol and a high level
of agreement and coordination between systems. To achieve cross domain del-
egation, the involved authority must also take into account the distribution of
applicable policies across various security domains. For example, if the dele-
gatee, the delegator and the service provider reside on three different security
domains, all policy sets of these three domains must be considered and fed to
the respective authorities responsible for the delegation process for a particular
request. This process is quite simple in single-domain delegation as there is only
one authority responsible for credential storage and decision making. However,
in addition to the distribution of policy, credential and delegation information
are also distributed in cross domain delegation. The typical scenario is that
the delegator and its local authority store and maintain part of the delegation
information related to the delegator while the delegatee and the authority of
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the delegatee’s domain store and maintain the rest. It is important to note
that the main characteristics of delegation, such as delegation boundary, where
delegation happens and where delegation is honoured, have a significant impact
on making design decisions. This is because these factors define the form and
functionality of the delegation model.
Together with the current trend in supporting cross domain collaborating
activities, it is also important to note that there is an increasing demand for
context-aware information to accommodate constraints and commitments for
the delegation process. As current role-based approaches use the relationship of
user-role-permission to impose constraints, it is difficult to present the additional
context information to the access decision authority. Thus, there is a demand
for a more expressive approach than the current role-based mechanisms. This is
the reason why recent approaches such as Chadwick et al. [16] (using XACML)
or Gomi et al. [21] (using SAML), etc. have adopted the policy language-based
approach.
One of the important criterion is the support of authority pre-approval in
the delegation process. This feature is largely ignored by the earlier approaches
[30, 18, 34, 37]. However, recently, this criterion has become a differentiating
factor to mark the advancement of a delegation model. This criterion is a
indicator of the high level of flexibility which the delegation model can offer in
a ad-hoc delegation process. The more recent proposals such as Chadwick et
al. [16] or XACML v3.0 [6] pay strong attention on this feature indicating its
importance in ad-hoc delegation.
Similarly to the authority pre-approval criterion, the issue of how to repre-
sent and communicate the delegation is also important factor to consider. As
mentioned earlier, the delegation can be communicated by issuing a token or by
creating a policy that honours the delegation. Until recently, most approaches
assume that delegation should be communicated via exchanging a token that
contains a delegation credential [30, 18, 34, 37]. Recently, XACML v3.0 [6]
discusses an alternative approach of creating new policy or rules to give effect
to delegation, including ad-hoc delegation. This issue is important from an ar-
chitectural perspective because, with the old approach (exchanging tokens), the
access control architecture does not need to change. Only the authority that
receives the delegation token needs to adapt to understand the nature of del-
egation tokens to make appropriate decisions. However, if using the approach
of creating policies, the access control architecture needs to change to take into
account the policies created by users as the result of the delegation process.
Language-based approaches such as XACML can better address the issue
of constraints because the language itself is highly expressive and flexible, and
they are not limited to a particular access control model. Even though policy
language-based communication is exposed to high processing and communica-
tion overhead and may result in low performance, this may be the only feasi-
ble approach to address the needs of controlled collaborative activities across
multiple security domains where constraints and context-awareness are critical.
Depending on the level of application of a policy language-based approach, each
model achieves a different level of expressiveness. The positive effects of ap-
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plying the policy language-based approach can be seen clearly in Chadwick et
al.’s model [16] against the classic role-based approach in PBDM [38] or RBDM
family [12]. However, application of a policy language is not the sole factor that
determines the usefulness of a model because there are other factors that affect
the final outcomes such as how the language is implemented, to what extent the
language is implemented, the power of the language itself.
5. Applying the Taxonomy to Some Delegation Approaches
In this section, the taxonomy criteria are utilised to compare some notable
delegation approaches. For brevity, this article does not discuss in detail each
approach, but instead gives a brief discussion about the notable features and
characteristics of each approach based on the taxonomy dimensions presented
in Table 1. This section provides an illustration of how the taxonomy can be
applied to distinguish delegation approaches from each other. The taxonomy is
applied to draw out the notable features and characteristics of those delegation
approaches.
Delegation issues have captured the attention of researchers for quite a long
time, as early as the end of the 1980s. Varadharajan, Allen and Black’s work in
1991 discussed in detail how a protocol for delegation should be structured [30].
Their papers also discussed how the protocols can be achieved with symmetric
and asymmetric key schemes. Based on the taxonomy, it can be said that
the model of Varadharajan, Allen and Black is specifically designed to support
both key schemes. From delegation perspective, the work, via the delegation
of privilege, does not clearly explain the objective of the delegation process
(capability or responsibility). It also fails to explicitly discuss the relationship of
delegator and delegatee. While the protocol has the potential to extend to cover
cross domain transactions, it does not cover this issue in detail.
Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) is designed to be an alternative for
the X.509 standard [20]. In 1996, SPKI was merged with Simple Distributed
Security Infrastructure (SDSI) by Ron Rivest and Butler Lampson and was
named SPKI/SDSI. As one of major architectures in trust management, dele-
gation plays a central role in SPKI/SDSI. The SPKI/SDSI specification defines
an authorisation certificate format so that delegation can be conducted by ex-
changing tokens. In theory, SPKI/SDSI can support both delegation from user
and system authority. Indirect delegation is fully supported via the use of a
chain of certificates [10]. In addition, Authority pre-approval is always neces-
sary to issue a certificate. Where the delegation is honoured is dependent on
the implementation of the access control mechanism. Delegation across multi-
ple security domains is not supported as a built-in function of SPKI/SDSI, but
can be achieved via certain special arrangement similar to the bridge certificate
authority in PKI for example, Federal PKI Architecture [3, 36].
Zhang, Oh and Sandhu presented a new permission-based delegation model
(PBDM) in 2003 [38]. This model fully supports user-to-user, temporal, partial
and multi-step delegation. This model is later extended and presented in three
variants called PBDM0, PBDM1 and PBDM2. All variants are based on RBAC
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and use user-to-role assignment to perform the delegation operations. Some
authors have argued that PBDM0 has a major problem because a user can
delegate any permission to a delegation role [18, 34]. This problem is fixed
in PBDM1. The PBDM family can support multi-step delegation, but they
neither support constraints in delegation, nor delegation across multiple security
domains [18]. In this model, both types of grant and transfer delegation are
supported. The PBDM family can be considered as an extension of the RBDM
[12] and RDM [37] models. As an abstract model, the approach to represent
delegation is not discussed.
In a similar approach, Wainer and Kumar considered various constraints
that can be applied to RBAC delegation and presented a more fine-grained
user delegation model which supports both total and partial delegation [32].
The model also supports temporal delegation. This model distinguishes two
types of access rights: object rights (a type of delegation of capability) and
delegation rights with constraints. However, similarly to other models, it uses
user-to-role assignments to perform delegation. An extension of this model with
time-restricted delegation which uses timeout to revoke the delegation is also
proposed [32]. This model uses a combination of user-to- group assignment to
perform partial and role-to-role delegation, while it employs user-role assignment
to do total delegation. The work of Wang and Osborn [33] and Crampton and
Khambhammettu [18] are similar to this model.
In 2005, in an effort to address constraint issues in delegation, Atluri and
Warner studied delegation in the workflow context and introduced a conditional
delegation model [9]. This model introduces several types of constraint (con-
ditions) to control delegation such as intervals, workload limitations and task
attributes. Several rules are defined to support conditional delegation. Some
constraints can be verified before the execution of a workflow and some must be
verified and enforced during workflow execution. This is an interesting delega-
tion approach as it investigates the problem of delegation with an ad-hoc nature.
This is also one of the first models that details how delegation should be han-
dled at the user level and how/where the delegation should be honoured. This
model is one of the pioneers in the field that addresses the issue of delegation
in the workflow context. However, similar to previous models, this work also
fails to discuss the relationships between the delegator, the delegatee and the
service provider. This approach also investigates the consistency of delegation
constraints and policies.
Gomi et al. presented a basic framework to conduct grant delegation and
revocation of access privileges across security domains. The model of Gomi et
al. [21] requires the delegator to request the delegation assertion via an addi-
tional authority called Delegation Authority (DA). Gomi et al.’s model forces
every delegated privilege to be expressed in a delegation assertion that is signed
by the DA which is an issuer of the assertion. This model lacks the capability
to check for constraints and resolve conflicts between delegated privileges and
between the delegated privileges with the involved policies. Therefore, it can
cause problems in indirect delegation which happens across multiple security do-
mains. The issue of authority pre-approval in the delegation process is partially
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discussed via the appearance of the delegation authority.
As part of effort to develop PERMIS, Chadwick et al. proposed a mech-
anism based on the XACML conceptual and data flow models to address the
issue of dynamic delegation of authority which involves the issuing of credentials
from one user to another (user delegation) [16]. The model is based on X.509.
It is important to note that the delegation mechanism of Chadwick is based
on certain features of Privilege Management Infrastructure (PMI). However,
the delegation approach is novel and based on a new conceptual entity called
the Credential Validation Service, which works alongside the PDP in making
authorisation decisions. The main disadvantage is that the proposed architec-
ture cannot handle sophisticated delegation trees [16]. The model, therefore,
does not support indirect delegation well. Similarly to Gomi et al.’s work, this
model, via the Credential Service, partially discusses the issue of authority pre-
approval but does not explicitly describe how delegation can happen without
the pre-approval. Together with the approaches of Gomi et al. and Atluri and
Warner, Chadwick et al. is one of the pioneers in the field which thoroughly
discuss the role of an additional authority in the delegation process.
Recently, the XACML Administration and Delegation profile, as part of a
draft for XACML 3.0, is designed to address two main delegation use cases [6]:
• Policy Administration: There is a demand for a policy administration
mechanism to control the types of policies that individuals can create and
modify. Typically, different individuals may be allowed to create policies
for certain resources. This approach is based on users’ attributes. The
other approach is based on the involved attributes such as action type,
subject or some other properties.
• Dynamic Delegation: Individuals may be allowed to create policies on
demand for a limited duration.
By implementing Administration and Delegation Profile, XACML 3.0 is de-
signed to support user delegation as well as administrative delegation. The
reduction algorithm is designed to zero the root of authority in the delegation
process. In the context of XACML 3.0, it is the process of trace back to the
policy or set of policies which makes the delegation policy effective. This algo-
rithm effectively allows indirect delegation. It is important to note that XACML
3.0 allows delegation without authority pre-approval. The delegation without
pre-approval is subject to low level of trust and then some extra steps of autho-
risation and verification are applied. The PDP is tasked to cover the additional
steps which makes the PDP the responsible authority for delegation process.
The profile is also designed to overcome the limitation of XACML 2.0 by
allowing delegation without duplicating policies applied for the delegator to
the delegatee [6]. It is up to the application to implement its own model for
delegation policy revocation. How the issuer of the revocation is authenticated
and how the effect of revocation is implemented is not specified by this profile
[6]. The profile allows a greater degree of flexibility and efficiency comparing to
XACML 2.0 in expressing and enforcing delegation policy.
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Table 2 provides a summarised comparison for the delegation approaches
mentioned above.
6. Summary and Conclusion
This article discussed the concept of delegation via a number of dimensions;
presented a taxonomy of delegation concepts in the context of information sys-
tems and applied it to several delegation proposals. The taxonomy proposed,
as summarised in Table 1, can be utilised as a basic benchmark to compare
and evaluate the delegation approaches as presented in Table 2. The taxon-
omy provides a list of possible alternatives of common delegation characteristics
together with advantages and limitations. The taxonomy can also be used to
understand the major focus of a particular delegation approach by observing
the characteristics involved. The taxonomy can help raise awareness of various
design settings and potential implications on existing access control infrastruc-
tures. For example, by applying the taxonomy to the PBDM family, the design
concerns (a strong focus on delegation at the system level), the similarities of
these models, and the differences between these models and the others such as
Wainer and Kumar [32], Atluri and Warner [9], etc. can be explained.
Therefore, it can be said that this study is significant for several reasons.
First of all, with the emerging demands in federating multiple enterprise sys-
tems to achieve complex and collaborative activities, delegation is becoming a
common approach to provide dynamic and flexible access control decisions. Sec-
ondly, delegation is considered a comparatively new research area and requires
more input from the academic and industrial community and, although recent
research has addressed the problems, several issues still remain to be investigated
and resolved. Therefore, this research should provide system designers a clear
picture about the characteristics of different types of delegation approaches and
the involved actors so that they can choose the type of delegation that best sat-
isfies their requirements. Thirdly, as collaborative environments require a great
level of interoperability, knowledge of characteristics and protocols of different
types of delegation could vastly improve the integration process. Fourthly, at
the moment, as there are many efforts from large industrial bodies to address
the requirements of dynamic access control via delegation, this research can be
considered as a first step towards the standardisation process.
Finally, it should be noted that the set of delegation proposals reviewed in
this article is not exhaustive. The main focus has been on models that support
secure task distribution in workflow or secure ad-hoc collaboration. Therefore,
as future work, other aspects of delegation will be considered such as the rubric
of logic-based and cryptographic approaches.
References
[1] ISO/IEC 10181-3:199 Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnec-
tion - Security Frameworks for Open Systems: Access Control Framework
24
C
h
a
r
a
c
te
r
is
ti
c
V
a
r
a
d
h
a
r
a
ja
n
e
t
a
l.
S
P
K
I/
S
D
S
I
P
B
D
M
F
a
m
-
il
y
W
a
in
e
r
&
K
u
m
a
r
A
tl
u
r
i
a
n
d
W
a
r
n
e
r
G
o
m
i
e
t
a
l.
C
h
a
d
w
ic
k
e
t
a
l.
X
A
C
M
L
3
.0
M
o
ti
v
a
ti
o
n
In
su
ffi
ci
en
t
a
u
-
th
o
ri
sa
ti
o
n
In
su
ffi
ci
en
t
a
u
-
th
o
ri
sa
ti
o
n
In
su
ffi
ci
en
t
a
u
-
th
o
ri
sa
ti
o
n
In
su
ffi
ci
en
t
a
u
-
th
o
ri
sa
ti
o
n
a
n
d
p
o
li
ci
es
In
su
ffi
ci
en
t
a
u
-
th
o
ri
sa
ti
o
n
a
n
d
co
n
fl
ic
te
d
p
o
li
-
ci
es
In
su
ffi
ci
en
t
a
u
-
th
o
ri
sa
ti
o
n
In
su
ffi
ci
en
t
a
u
-
th
o
ri
sa
ti
o
n
a
n
d
co
n
fl
ic
te
d
p
o
li
-
ci
es
In
su
ffi
ci
en
t
a
u
-
th
o
ri
sa
ti
o
n
a
n
d
co
n
fl
ic
te
d
p
o
li
-
ci
es
D
el
eg
a
ti
o
n
B
o
u
n
d
a
ry
W
it
h
in
a
si
n
g
le
d
o
m
a
in
W
it
h
in
a
n
d
cr
o
ss
se
cu
ri
ty
d
o
m
a
in
W
it
h
in
a
si
n
g
le
d
o
m
a
in
W
it
h
in
a
si
n
g
le
d
o
m
a
in
W
it
h
in
a
n
d
cr
o
ss
se
cu
ri
ty
d
o
m
a
in
s
W
it
h
in
a
n
d
cr
o
ss
se
cu
ri
ty
d
o
m
a
in
s
W
it
h
in
a
n
d
cr
o
ss
se
cu
ri
ty
d
o
m
a
in
s
N
o
t
sp
ec
ifi
ed
W
h
o
re
q
u
es
ts
d
el
eg
a
ti
o
n
?
U
se
r
U
se
r
o
r
S
y
st
em
a
u
th
o
ri
ty
U
se
r
o
r
S
y
st
em
a
u
th
o
ri
ty
U
se
r
o
r
S
y
st
em
a
u
th
o
ri
ty
M
a
in
ly
fo
cu
s
o
n
U
se
r
le
v
el
U
se
r
U
se
r
U
se
r
o
r
S
y
st
em
a
u
th
o
ri
ty
W
h
o
d
el
e-
g
a
te
s?
U
se
r
U
se
r
o
r
S
y
st
em
a
u
th
o
ri
ty
U
se
r
o
r
S
y
st
em
a
u
th
o
ri
ty
U
se
r
o
r
S
y
st
em
a
u
th
o
ri
ty
U
se
r
U
se
r
U
se
r
U
se
r
o
r
S
y
st
em
a
u
th
o
ri
ty
R
el
a
ti
o
n
sh
ip
o
f
th
e
p
a
rt
ie
s
B
o
th
d
ir
ec
t
a
n
d
in
d
ir
ec
t
B
o
th
d
ir
ec
t
a
n
d
in
d
ir
ec
t
B
o
th
d
ir
ec
t
a
n
d
in
d
ir
ec
t
M
a
in
ly
d
ir
ec
t
b
u
t
ca
n
b
e
ex
te
n
d
ed
to
su
p
p
o
rt
in
d
i-
re
ct
d
el
eg
a
ti
o
n
B
o
th
d
ir
ec
t
a
n
d
in
d
ir
ec
t
B
o
th
d
ir
ec
t
a
n
d
in
d
ir
ec
t
D
ir
ec
t.
In
d
i-
re
ct
d
el
eg
a
ti
o
n
is
n
o
t
cl
ea
rl
y
d
is
cu
ss
ed
.
B
o
th
d
ir
ec
t
a
n
d
in
d
ir
ec
t
A
u
th
o
ri
ty
P
re
-
A
p
p
ro
v
a
l
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
t
sp
ec
ifi
ed
N
o
t
sp
ec
ifi
ed
N
o
t
sp
ec
ifi
ed
Y
es
P
a
rt
ia
ll
y
d
is
-
cu
ss
ed
N
o
W
h
a
t
to
d
el
e-
g
a
te
?
C
a
p
a
b
il
it
y
o
r
R
es
p
o
n
si
b
il
it
y
C
a
p
a
b
il
it
y
C
a
p
a
b
il
it
y
a
n
d
R
es
p
o
n
si
b
il
it
y
C
a
p
a
b
il
it
y
C
a
p
a
b
il
it
y
a
n
d
R
es
p
o
n
si
b
il
it
y
C
a
p
a
b
il
it
y
a
n
d
R
es
p
o
n
si
b
il
it
y
C
a
p
a
b
il
it
y
a
n
d
R
es
p
o
n
si
b
il
it
y
C
a
p
a
b
il
it
y
H
o
w
m
u
ch
to
d
el
eg
a
te
?
P
a
rt
ia
l
o
r
T
o
ta
l
P
a
rt
ia
l
o
r
T
o
ta
l
P
a
rt
ia
l
o
r
T
o
ta
l
P
a
rt
ia
l
o
r
T
o
ta
l
P
a
rt
ia
l
o
r
T
o
ta
l
P
a
rt
ia
l
o
r
T
o
ta
l
P
a
rt
ia
l
d
el
e-
g
a
ti
o
n
is
n
o
t
sp
ec
ifi
ed
N
o
t
sp
ec
ifi
ed
H
o
w
lo
n
g
to
d
el
eg
a
te
?
T
em
p
o
ra
l
o
r
P
er
m
a
n
en
t
T
em
p
o
ra
l
o
r
P
er
m
a
n
en
t
T
em
p
o
ra
l
o
r
P
er
m
a
n
en
t
T
em
p
o
ra
l
o
r
P
er
m
a
n
en
t
T
em
p
o
ra
l
o
r
P
er
m
a
n
en
t
T
em
p
o
ra
l
o
r
P
er
m
a
n
en
t
T
em
p
o
ra
l
o
r
P
er
m
a
n
en
t
T
em
p
o
ra
l
o
r
P
er
m
a
n
en
t
H
o
w
to
d
el
e-
g
a
te
?
G
ra
n
t
G
ra
n
t
o
r
T
ra
n
sf
er
G
ra
n
t
G
ra
n
t
o
r
T
ra
n
sf
er
G
ra
n
t
o
r
T
ra
n
sf
er
G
ra
n
t
G
ra
n
t
G
ra
n
t
o
r
T
ra
n
sf
er
A
p
p
ro
a
ch
to
co
n
d
u
ct
d
el
eg
a
ti
o
n
B
y
ex
ch
a
n
g
in
g
to
k
en
s
B
y
ex
ch
a
n
g
in
g
to
k
en
s
N
o
t
sp
ec
ifi
ed
N
o
t
sp
ec
ifi
ed
N
o
t
sp
ec
ifi
ed
B
y
ex
ch
a
n
g
in
g
to
k
en
s
B
y
ex
ch
a
n
g
in
g
to
k
en
s
B
y
is
su
in
g
p
o
li
-
ci
es
T
y
p
e
o
f
C
re
-
d
en
ti
a
l
G
en
er
ic
T
o
k
en
G
en
er
ic
to
k
en
N
o
t
sp
ec
ifi
ed
N
o
t
sp
ec
ifi
ed
N
o
t
sp
ec
ifi
ed
X
.5
0
9
,
S
A
M
L
o
r
G
en
er
ic
to
-
k
en
X
.5
0
9
,
S
A
M
L
o
r
G
en
er
ic
to
-
k
en
N
o
t
a
p
p
li
ca
b
le
K
ey
S
ch
em
e
S
y
m
m
et
ri
c
o
r
A
sy
m
m
et
ri
c
A
sy
m
m
et
ri
c
N
o
t
sp
ec
ifi
ed
N
o
t
sp
ec
ifi
ed
N
o
t
sp
ec
ifi
ed
S
y
m
m
et
ri
c
o
r
A
sy
m
m
et
ri
c
S
y
m
m
et
ri
c
o
r
A
sy
m
m
et
ri
c
N
o
t
sp
ec
ifi
ed
W
h
er
e
d
el
eg
a
-
ti
o
n
h
a
p
p
en
s?
U
se
r
le
v
el
B
o
th
b
u
t
m
a
in
ly
ta
rg
et
th
e
S
y
st
em
le
v
el
B
o
th
b
u
t
m
a
in
ly
ta
rg
et
th
e
S
y
st
em
le
v
el
U
se
r
le
v
el
U
se
r
le
v
el
U
se
r
le
v
el
U
se
r
le
v
el
U
se
r
le
v
el
W
h
er
e
d
el
-
eg
a
ti
o
n
is
h
o
n
o
u
re
d
?
N
o
t
sp
ec
ifi
ed
N
o
t
sp
ec
ifi
ed
N
o
t
sp
ec
ifi
ed
A
ce
n
tr
a
l
a
u
-
th
o
ri
ty
b
a
se
d
o
n
R
B
A
C
A
ce
n
tr
a
l
a
u
-
th
o
ri
ty
b
a
se
d
o
n
R
B
A
C
A
n
a
d
d
it
io
n
a
l
co
m
p
o
n
en
t
ca
ll
ed
D
el
eg
a
-
ti
o
n
A
u
th
o
ri
ty
A
n
a
d
d
it
io
n
a
l
co
m
p
o
n
en
t
ca
ll
ed
C
re
d
en
-
ti
a
l
S
er
vi
ce
X
A
C
M
L
P
D
P
T
ab
le
2:
A
co
m
pa
ri
so
n
be
tw
ee
n
so
m
e
no
ta
bl
e
de
le
ga
ti
on
ap
pr
oa
ch
es
us
in
g
th
e
ta
xo
no
m
y’
s
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s.
25
(1996), Available http://www.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/009609199/
chap3.htm#tagcjh_04_02_02 Cited 12th September 2009.
[2] Draft Standard for Information Technology - Portable Operating System
Interface (POSIX) (1997), Available http://www.suse.de/~agruen/acl/
posix/posix_1003.2c-990310.pdf Cited 10th January 2008.
[3] Federal PKI Architecture, Available http://www.idmanagement.gov/
fpkia/ Cited 12th September 2009.
[4] Assertions and Protocols for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Lan-
guage (SAML) v2.0, Available http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/
saml/v2.0/saml-core-2.0-os.pdf Cited 15th November 2009.
[5] eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) Version 2.0,
Available http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/download.php/
10577/XACML-2.0-OS-ALL.zip Cited 10th August 2009.
[6] XACML Administration and Delegation Profile, Available http://www.
oasis-open.org/committees/document.php?document_id=32425 Cite
10th July 2009.
[7] Microsoft Web Services Security Specifications Index Page, Available
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms951273.aspx Cited
10th November 2009.
[8] Abrams, M. D., LaPadula, L. J., Eggers, K. W. and Olson, I. M., A Gen-
eralized Framework for Access Control: An Informal Description, In Pro-
ceedings of the 13th National Computer Security, Washington, USA, 1990,
pp. 13-143.
[9] Atluri, V. and Warner, J., Supporting conditional delegation in secure
workflow management systems, In Proceedings of the 10th ACM sympo-
sium on Access control models and technologies (SACMAT’05), Stockholm,
Sweden, 2005, pp. 49-58.
[10] Aura, T., Distributed access-rights management with delegation certifi-
cates, Secure Internet Programming: Security Issues for Distributed and
Mobile Objects, J. Vitek and C. Jensen (Eds.), 1603 (1999) 211-235.
[11] Baldwin, R. W., Naming and Grouping Privileges To Simplify Security
Management in Large Databases, in Proceedings IEEE Computer Society
Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy, April 1990, pp. 184-194.
[12] Barka, E. and Sandhu, R., Role-Based Delegation Model - Hierarchical
Roles (RBDM1), In Proceedings of the 20th Annual Computer Security
Applications Conference (ACSAC’04), 2004, pp. 396-404.
[13] Botha, R. A. and Eloff, J. H. P., A framework for access control in workflow
systems. Information Management & Computer Security, 9(3), 2001, pp.
126-133.
26
[14] Calvelli, C. and Varadharajan, V., An analysis of some delegation proto-
cols for distributed systems, In Computer Security Foundations Workshop,
1992, pp. 92-110.
[15] Chadwick, D. W. and Otenko, A., The PERMIS X.509 Role Based Privilege
Management Infrastructure, In Proceedings of the 7th ACM symposium on
Access control models and technologies, Monterey, California, USA, 2002,
pp. 135-140.
[16] Chadwick, D. W., Otenko, S. and Nguyen, T. A., Adding support to
XACML for Dynamic Delegation of Authority in multiple domains, In
Proceedings of the 10th IFIP Open Conference on Communications and
Multimedia Security (CMS 2006), Heraklion Crete, Greece, 2006, pp. 67-
86.
[17] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R. and Polk,
W. Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Re-
vocation List (CRL) Profile (RFC5280) (2008). Available http://tools.
ietf.org/html/rfc5280 Cited 15th November 2009.
[18] Crampton, J. and Khambhammettu, H., Delegation in Role-Based Access
Control, In Proceedings of the 11th European Symposium On Research In
Computer Security (ESORICS 2006), Hamburg, Germany, 2006, pp. 174-
191.
[19] Crispo, B., Delegation of Responsibility. Lecture Notes in Computer Science
(LNCS) - Security Protocols, 1550 (1999) 626.
[20] Ellison, C., SPKI/SDSI Certificates, Available http://world.std.com/
~cme/html/spki.html Cited 12th September 2009.
[21] Gomi, H., Hatakeyama, M., Hosono, S., and Fujita, S., A delegation frame-
work for federated identity management, In Proceedings of the ACM Work-
shop on Digital Identity Management, 2005, pp. 94-103.
[22] Lorch, M., Adams, D., Kafura, D., Koneni, M., Rathi, A., and Shah, S.,
The PRIMA System for Privilege Management, Authorization and En-
forcement in Grid Environments, In Proceedings of the 4th International
Workshop on Grid Computing - Grid 2003, Phoenix, AR, USA, 2003.
[23] Moffett, J. and Sloman, M., The Source of Authority for Commercial Access
Control, Computer, 21(2), 1988, pp. 59-69.
[24] Moffett, J., Delegation of Authority Using Domain Based Access Rules.
PhD Thesis, University of London, London, UK, 1990.
[25] Pham, Q., McCullagh, A., and Dawson, E., Consistency of User Attribute
in Federated Systems, In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference
on Trust, Privacy & Security in Digital Business (TrustBus 2007), Regens-
burg, Germany, 2007, pp. 165-177.
27
[26] Roe, M., Certification and Delegation, In Proceedings of the 6th Interna-
tional Workshop on Security Protocols, 1998, pp. 168-176.
[27] Ruan, C. and Varadharajan, V., A weighted graph approach to authori-
sation delegation and conflict resolution, In Proceedings of the 9th Aus-
tralasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy (ACISP 2004),
Australia, 2004, pp. 402-413.
[28] Sandhu, R., Separation of Duties in Computerised Information Systems, In
Proceedings of the IFIG WG11.3 Workshop in Database Security, Halifax,
United Kingdom, 1990, pp. 179-189.
[29] Schaad, A., A Framework for Organisational Control Principles. PhD The-
sis, The University of York, York, UK, 2003.
[30] Varadharajan, V., Allen, P., and Black, S., An analysis of the proxy prob-
lem in distributed systems, In Proceedings of the 1991 IEEE Symposium on
Research in Security and Privacy, Oakland, CA, USA, 1991, pp. 255-275.
[31] Varadharajan, V., Authentication in mobile distributed environment, In
Proceedings of the 7th IEEE European Conference on Mobile and Personal
Communications, 1993, pp. 173-188.
[32] Wainer, J. and Kumar, A., A Fine-grained, Controllable, User to User Del-
egation Method in RBAC, In Proceedings of the 10th ACM symposium on
Access control models and technologies (SACMAT’05), Stockholm, Sweden,
2005, pp. 59-66.
[33] Wang, H. and Osborn, S., Delegation in the role graph model, In Proceed-
ings of the 11th Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies
(SACMAT’06), Lake Tahoe, California, USA, 2006, pp. 91-100.
[34] Wang, H., Zhang, Y., and Cao, J., Formal authorisation allocation ap-
proaches for permission-role assignments using relational algebra opera-
tions, In Proceedings of the 14th Australasian database conference, Ade-
laide, Australia, 2003, pp. 125-133.
[35] Wang, J., Vecchio, D., and Humphrey, M., Extending the Security Asser-
tion Markup Language to Support Delegation for Web Services and Grid
Services, In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Web Ser-
vices (ICWS’05), Orlando, Florida, USA, 2005, pp. 67-74.
[36] Polk, W. T. and Hastings, N. E., Bridge Certification Authorities: Connect-
ing B2B Public Key Infrastructures, In Proceedings of the PKI Forum Meet-
ing, 2000, Available http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_
infra/documents/B2B-article.pdf Cited 12th September 2009.
[37] Zhang, L., Ahn, G. L., and Chu, B. T., A rule-based framework for role
based delegation, In Proceedings of the 6th ACM symposium on Access
control models and technologies, Chantilly, VA, USA, 2001, pp. 153-162.
28
[38] Zhang, X., Oh, S., and Sandhu, R., PBDM: a flexible delegation model in
RBAC, In Proceedings of the 8th ACM symposium on Access control models
and technologies, Como, Italy, 2003, pp. 149-157.
29
